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Abstract. The performance of an anonymous path can be described
using many network metrics – e.g., bandwidth, latency, jitter, loss, etc.
However, existing relay selection algorithms have focused exclusively
on producing paths with high bandwidth. In contrast to traditional
node-based path techniques in which relay selection is biased by relays’
node-characteristics (i.e., bandwidth), this paper presents the case for
link-based path generation in which relay selection is weighted in fa-
vor of the highest performing links. Link-based relay selection supports
more flexible routing, enabling anonymous paths with low latency, jitter,
and loss, in addition to high bandwidth. Link-based approaches are also
more secure than node-based techniques, eliminating “hotspots” in the
network that attract a disproportionate amount of traffic. For example,
misbehaving relays cannot advertise themselves as “low-latency” nodes
to attract traffic, since latency has meaning only when measured between
two endpoints. We argue that link-based path selection is practical for
certain anonymity networks, and describe mechanisms for efficiently stor-
ing and disseminating link information.
1 Introduction
Anonymous communication networks have been gaining in popularity in recent
years. As they scale to support large user bases and diverse applications, there is
an increasing need not only for these networks to ensure that high performance
routes are selected, but also to provide flexibility to tradeoff between performance
and anonymity in order to meet the requirements of different applications.
In response to these challenges, there have been a variety of proposals [6,22,35]
that are aimed at improving the performance of anonymous routes. These pro-
posals have primarily used node characteristics such as self-advertised band-
width [6,3] as the main criteria for selecting intermediate relay nodes.
In this paper, we argue that an alternative – one that offers strong security
guarantees and flexibility – is to utilize link-based path selection strategies. In
link-based selection, the sender (also called the initiator) selects high performing
links to construct her anonymous paths. The initiator ranks randomly generated
(but not instantiated) paths according to their predicted end-to-end (e2e) per-
formance, estimated by aggregating the costs of their constituent links. From
its set of candidate paths, the initiator selects (and subsequently constructs)
a path using a probability distribution weighted by the e2e cost estimates. As
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with recently proposed node-based strategies [35], our link-based algorithm al-
lows the sender to bias her paths towards either anonymity or performance.
Link-based routing is appropriate for anonymity networks in which the perfor-
mance of anonymous paths is determined by the network topology rather than
local effects at end nodes (e.g., congestion, queuing delay, etc.).
Link-based path selection offers several advantages over node-based tech-
niques. First, link-based path selection supports various metrics such as latency,
bandwidth, jitter, and loss. The flexibility provided by link-based solutions en-
ables anonymity networks to support a wide variety of network applications that
have previously been considered incompatible with these networks. For exam-
ple, real-time applications (in particular, VoIP clients) require connections with
specific latency, jitter, and loss properties. Existing node-based path selection al-
gorithms cannot accurately predict the link properties of their generated routes
and are therefore unfit for particular classes of network communication.
Second, link-based strategies are less susceptible to manipulation. In a node-
based scheme, a malicious node can easily advertise favorable node characteris-
tics in order to increase the likelihood of being selected as a relay node [3]. Given
that link metrics are defined only with respect to a pair of relays, the same at-
tack strategy is harder to succeed without the infiltration of a large number of
attackers. For instance, a host cannot truthfully promote itself as a “low-latency
node”, as such a claim may be accurate only for its nearby peers.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
The case for link-based strategies: Using realistic network traces [14,38,40],
we demonstrate that link-based selection not only achieves a high degree of
flexibility by supporting a variety of metrics, it is also significantly more re-
silient to manipulation as compared to node-based strategies. To quantify the
anonymity properties of relay selection, we introduce node prevalence, a metric
that measures the probability that a relay participates in an anonymous path.
For example, using a snapshot of available bandwidths from the Tor [7] network’s
directory servers, we note that the highest bandwidth Tor relay is expected to
participate in nearly 40% of anonymous paths when Tor’s default relay selection
algorithm is used. In comparison, the most popular node using our link-based
selection strategy on a comparable dataset (in which bandwidth is described as
a link characteristic) is present in just 2.5% of paths. We show that our tech-
niques leak little information about the communicating parties, protecting their
anonymity even against powerful and colluding adversaries.
Practical link-based selection implementation: A potential disadvantage
of link-based path selection is the need to maintain pairwise link information.
We demonstrate that network coordinate embedding systems [4,5,23] provide a
lightweight and scalable mechanism for maintaining link-based metrics while re-
quiring only minimal communication overhead at each node. In coordinate sys-
tems, each node is mapped to n-dimensional coordinates such that the Cartesian
distance between two nodes’ coordinates corresponds to the network distance
(e.g., latency, bandwidth, jitter, or loss) between them. Participants of coor-
dinate embedding systems update their coordinate by periodically conducting
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measurements between themselves and randomly selected peers. Each node
maintains a single coordinate for each link metric and updates a directory ser-
vice whenever its coordinates change. Coordinate embedding systems effectively
linearize the amount of information required to represent pairwise link charac-
teristics, since the coordinates of N nodes are sufficient to estimate pairwise
distances.
2 Assumptions and Limitations
The link-based path selection strategies presented in this paper estimate the e2e
performance of potential anonymous routes by aggregating the costs of their
constituent hops. For example, the e2e latency of a possible anonymous path
is estimated by summing the latencies between adjacent nodes in the path. To
be effective, link-based routing requires that path performance (whether it be
measured by bandwidth, latency, jitter, etc.) be due to network effects.
If, however, local effects at end nodes (e.g., congestion or queuing delay)
dominate performance, then link-based path selection is less effective (since the
savings gained from optimizing link costs is overshadowed by node effects). At
the extreme, link-based selection becomes equivalent to node-based selection
when the communication cost of routing between two nodes is determined solely
by properties of the receiving host.
The performance and anonymity results in the remainder of this paper as-
sume path performance is dictated by the network rather than end-host effects.
Although we leave the determination of the dominant factors that influence per-
formance in various anonymity networks as a future research direction, we briefly
note that link-based relay selection is likely better suited for P2P anonymity net-
works rather than networks in which the client to relay ratio is very high (e.g.,
in the case of Tor), causing congestion to determine path performance.
3 Related Work
Previously proposed relay selection techniques have focused on improving the
bandwidth of generated paths [6,35]. To produce high bandwidth routes, the
Tor [7] path selection algorithm sorts relays in increasing order of bandwidth
and computes the sum B =
∑|N |−1
i=0 bi, where bi is the bandwidth of node i. The
initiator chooses r uniformly at random from [0, B) and selects the node with
index k as a relay, where k is the largest integer such that
∑k−1
i=0 bi ≤ r. The
initiator repeats this procedure to select each relay in the anonymous circuit [6].1
Øverlier and Syverson first identified that Tor’s path selection algorithm is
susceptible to manipulation [24]. By falsely advertising high bandwidths, nodes
under an adversary’s control can exploit the weighted probability distribution
and increase their chances of being selected. If multiple nodes under the at-
tacker’s control are selected as relays, the adversary can apply a circuit-linking
1 In practice, Tor may apply different weights for entry and exit nodes. For simplicity,
we assume that all nodes may function as entry or exit relays.
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algorithm [3] or perform timing analysis [21] to discern whether two of its re-
lays reside on the same path. (Tor is designed to restrict each relay to knowing
only the previous and next hop [7].) If the attacker controls the first and last
relays in an anonymous path, he defeats anonymity since the first and last re-
lays respectively know the identities of the initiator and responder. Bauer et al.
demonstrate that when an adversary controlled just six of 66 nodes in a Tor
deployment on PlanetLab [25], the attacker compromised more than 46% of all
anonymous paths [3].
Snader and Borisov [35] propose two modifications to Tor to defend against
Øverlier et al.’s attack. First, to prevent nodes from reporting false bandwidths,
relays report the observed bandwidths of peer relays to the directory server.
When queried for a node’s bandwidth, the directory server reports the median
of the node’s observed measurements. Second, Snader and Borisov introduce
a more tunable weighting system in which the initiator can tradeoff between
anonymity and performance. They define the family of functions
fs(x) =
{
1−2sx
1−2s if s = 0
x if s = 0
(1)
where s is a parameter chosen by the initiator that allows it to tradeoff between
anonymity and performance. After having ranked the relays by bandwidth, the
initiator chooses the relay with index n · fs(x), where n is chosen uniformly
at random from [0, 1). By applying higher values of s, the initiator is able to
more heavily bias her selections towards bandwidth. If s = 0, a relay is chosen
uniformly at random [35]. Each relay is selected independently and without
replacement according to the distribution imposed by Eq. 1.
Snader and Borisov’s defense relies on opportunistic measurements – relays
report the observed bandwidths of their peers [35]. There are unfortunately
disadvantages of such an approach. First, a relay can report opportunistic mea-
surements only when it participates in an anonymous circuit with a peer. Trans-
mitting the observation to a directory server effectively informs the server of the
existence of the circuit as well as the identities of the two relays that constitute
one of its hops. Given that directory servers may be malicious, revealing seg-
ments of the path is undesirable. Second, the directory cannot discern whether
reported measurements are truthful. Colluding malicious relays may (falsely)
report that members of their coalition have high bandwidth. If there are a suf-
ficient number of attackers to influence the median of a relay’s measurements,
then Øverlier et al.’s attack becomes feasible. Finally, as noted in Murdoch and
Watson’s recent work [22], attackers may have access to large botnets and may
therefore join the anonymity network with relays that have sufficient bandwidth
to attract peers. The use of opportunistic measurements attempts to protect
against false self-reported measurements, but does not prevent an attacker from
acquiring high performing nodes to attract traffic. As we show below, link-based
measurements inherently reduce the attacker’s ability to influence path selection,
as each node is restricted to advertising a single coordinate, which, in turn, is
perceived as favorable only to its nearby peers.
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Table 1. Link concatenation operators. The distance between successive links is de-
noted as d1, d2, ..., dn.
Metric Path cost
Latency / RTT
∑ h
i=1 di
Bandwidth min(d1, d2, ..., dh)
Loss rate 1 − ∏hi=1(1 − di)
Jitter (variance)
∑ h
i=1 di
(assumes jitter of two successive links is independent)
Autonomous System (AS) Traversals
∑ h
i=1 di
The use of coordinate systems to estimate e2e path performance was first
proposed in our earlier position paper [33]. This paper presents novel path se-
lection algorithms, and is the first work of which we are aware that analyzes the
performance and anonymity properties of link-based relay selection.
4 Link-Based Path Selection
Existing approaches [6,7,35] to producing high performance anonymous paths
have focused exclusively on node characteristics – performance metrics (i.e.,
bandwidth) that may be attributed to individual relays. Node-based relay se-
lection strategies randomly select relays according to a nonuniform probability
distribution biased by the relays’ node characteristics.
In link-based path selection, the e2e performance of a path is computed by
aggregating the cost of all links that comprise the path, where cost is defined in
terms of link characteristics such as latency, loss, and jitter. (While bandwidth
is a node-based characteristic, it can also be represented as a link characteris-
tic by considering the measured available bandwidth on a link connecting two
nodes.) The use of link rather than node characteristics enables more flexible
routing, as initiators can construct anonymous routes that meet more specific
communication requirements.
Weighted Path Selection Our link-based path selection algorithm, Weighted,
operates in two phases. In the first phase, the initiator rapidly generates (but
does not instantiate) candidate paths consisting of three relays chosen uniformly
at random without replacement. The initiator computes the e2e cost of each
generated candidate path using a link concatenation operator (see Table 1).2 For
example, the e2e bandwidth of a path is the minimum of the bandwidths of
its links, whereas the latency of the route may be estimated by summing the
latencies of its hops.
In the second phase, the initiator sorts the candidate paths by their cost esti-
mates. Using the family of functions introduced by Snader and Borisov [35] (see
Eq. 1), the initiator instantiates the candidate path with index n · fs(x), where
2 Our approach may be extended to define the performance of a path in terms of
multiple metrics by assigning weights to each metric in a manner that reflects its
importance as determined by the initiator. The e2e path cost estimate is then cal-
culated as the weighted average over the cost estimates for each individual metric.
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n is chosen uniformly at random from [0, 1). As with Snader’s and Borisov’s
algorithm, a larger value of s more heavily weighs path selection in favor of
performance. When s = 0, each randomly generated path is equally likely to be
chosen. For clarity, we will refer to the case in which s = 0 as using the Uniform
selection strategy.
5 The Case for Link-Based Selection
In this section, we present the case for link-based path selection. We demon-
strate that link-based anonymous routing is flexible, enabling high performance
paths, whether performance be quantified in terms of bandwidth, latency, or
jitter. Additionally, we show that our selection strategy is more resilient to ma-
nipulation than previously established techniques, providing greater anonymity
to the communication endpoints.
We first consider an oracular model in which all measurements (node or link)
in the network are known to the initiator. This enables us to compare node- and
link-based path selection strategies irrespectively of their measurement tech-
niques. We revisit actual implementation strategies in Section 6.
5.1 Performance Analysis
Our performance analysis highlights two main benefits of link-based path selec-
tion over existing node-based techniques. First, link-based techniques support a
variety of performance metrics, hence offering greater flexibility. In particular,
the Weighted selection strategy produces paths with low latency and jitter,
few autonomous system (AS) traversals, and high bandwidth. Second, as with
recently proposed node-based approaches [35], our link-based relay strategy en-
ables the initiator to carefully tradeoff between anonymity and performance.
Our performance analysis is carried out using a trace-driven path simulator
that takes as input an N × N matrix describing the pairwise network distances
(i.e., latency, bandwidth, etc.) between relays. The pairwise link distances used
as input to the simulator are obtained from actual network traces [14,40] as
well as our own measurements carried out on the PlanetLab testbed [25]. Since
the performance and security of link-based path selection is influenced by the
underlying topology, we analyze the results of generating 150 anonymous paths
between each of the N(N − 1) pairs of relays. That is, for each pair of relays, we
generate anonymous paths between the pair using the remaining N − 2 nodes in
the dataset as potential relays. The simulator models a single pair of communi-
cants at any given time; i.e., we assume node congestion does not impact path
performance. To produce each path, Weighted generates (but does not instan-
tiate) 150 candidate paths before randomly selecting the chosen path according
to the weighted (e.g., by bandwidth) probability distribution.
Table 2 describes the trace-driven datasets used as input to our simulator.
The King [14] and S3-BW [40] datasets are based on measurements obtained from
prior publications and are commonly used in the networking research community;
PL-ASes and PL-Jitter represent newer metrics that are novel to this work. Due
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Table 2. Network datasets used to evaluate link-based relay selection
Dataset Metric Nodes Description
King [14] Latency 500 Pairwise latencies captured using the King method [12]
S3-BW [40] Available Bandwidth 365 Pairwise bandwidths from PlanetLab measured using
PathChirp [29]
PL-ASes AS Traversals 156 Pairwise number of AS crossings on PlanetLab measured
using traceroute
PL-Jitter Jitter (variance) 153 Pairwise jitter (variance of interarrival times of 30 pings)
on PlanetLab
Tor-BW Available Bandwidth 500 Available (also called “observed”) bandwidth of 500 Tor
nodes, obtained from Tor directory servers
to the lack of existing published traces on these metrics, we conducted our own
measurements using geographically distributed PlanetLab nodes.
Since simulation time grows geometrically with network size, only the pairwise
measurements for the first 500 relays from the King and Tor-BW datasets are
used as input to the simulator. The remaining datasets contained fewer than
500 nodes, and are used in their entirety.
Bandwidth metric: Fig. 1 shows the bandwidth improvement resulting from
using Weighted on the S3-BW dataset. When s = 9, Weighted more than
doubles the median available bandwidth over all pairwise paths to 42.3 Mbps,
compared to 20.1 Mbps when relays are selected uniformly at random
(Uniform). (Recall that relay selection is weighted more heavily towards perfor-
mance when s is increased.) The ability to provide high performance bandwidth
paths using link-based relay selection is particularly interesting, given that band-
width is often perceived as a node characteristic [2,15]. Bandwidth may, of course,
be represented as a link characteristic (as is the case in the S3-BW dataset). This
latter characterization enables more flexible routing, as bandwidth bottlenecks
may result from Internet routing policies rather than node capacities.
Non-bandwidth metrics: Fig. 2-4 demonstrates Weighted’s ability to produce
high performance paths for non-bandwidth metrics. The median e2e latency of
the anonymous paths formed using Uniform is 277.2ms (Fig. 2). The median
latency decreases by 20.6% to 220.1ms when s = 3 and by 52.7% to 131.2ms
when s = 15. Additionally, Weighted decreases the percentage of high latency
paths: 93.0% of paths produced via Uniform have latencies of 250ms or greater
compared to just 22.5% of routes generated using Weighted with s = 3.
Jitter, defined as the variance in interarrival times (measured in ms) of 30
ping messages, significantly decreased using Weighted. As shown in Fig. 3 (log
scale), the median jitter decreased by 72% when s = 3 and by 97% when s = 9.
It may also be advantageous to minimize the number of AS crossings in an
anonymous path, both to decrease the probability that a given AS can observe
multiple hops in the path [8] and also to potentially achieve greater path perfor-
mance (since routing within an AS is typically low-latency and high-bandwidth).
Although analyzing the relationships between AS traversals, anonymity, and per-
formance is beyond the scope of this paper, we include the metric here to empha-
size the flexibility of link-based routing. Fig. 4 shows the cumulative distribution
of AS traversals for anonymous paths. Using Uniform, 66% of anonymous paths
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traversed 12 or more ASes. When s = 3 and s = 9, only 10% and 0.3% of their
respective paths crossed 12 or more ASes.
5.2 Anonymity Analysis
Our anonymity analysis aims to compare the anonymity properties of link-based
and node-based relay selection under various attacker strategies. As with the
existing literature, we consider an anonymous route to be compromised if the
attacker controls its first and last relay [35]. (Resiliency to the predecessor at-
tack [28,39] is discussed in Appendix B.)
We model an attacker that controls or monitors f · N of a N -node network,
where 0 ≤ f < 1. We further assume that the adversary has complete network
information and may select a priori which of the f · N nodes it controls (e.g.,
those with highest bandwidth). While this is a particularly strong threat model,
it enables us to explore the limitations of our techniques by allowing the attacker
to select the most “attractive” relays in a realistic network topology.3 Due to the
3 Prior work utilizes attacker models in which the adversary may supplement the net-
work with additional malicious relays [22]. Link-based path selection is difficult to
accurately assess using such models, as the performance and anonymity of anony-
mous paths depend upon the precise locations of all relays.
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ease at which an adversary may acquire high performance nodes using a botnet,
we view our threat model as conservative, but realistic.
Node Prevalence. To quantitatively compare link- and node-based relay selec-
tion, we introduce a new measure of anonymity, node prevalence, defined as the
probability that a relay is selected as a participant in an anonymous path. Since
link-based routing selects relays based on e2e performance estimations (including
links containing the initiator or responder), we compute the node prevalence of
a relay as the average probability of selection over all combinations of initiators
and responders.4 Intuitively, relays with high node prevalences are valuable to
attackers since, by definition, they have a greater chance of being selected in
anonymous paths.
In node-based techniques, high-bandwidth nodes are consistently perceived
as attractive to all initiators, leading to relays with high node prevalences. In
contrast, the likelihood that a node will be attractive for all paths using link-
based approaches is fairly small, since a node’s attractiveness is a function of
the locations of the initiator, responder, and already chosen relays in the path.
The ability of link-based relay selection to prevent “hotspots” leads to increased
anonymity since a small coalition of malicious relays cannot easily attract a
disproportionate amount of traffic.
Fig. 5 plots the maximum of all relays’ node prevalences – the frequency at
which the most popularly chosen node is present in anonymous paths. Even when
Weighted is tuned for high performance (s = 15), the most popular relay is
present in less than 5% of paths in the King, S3-BW, and PL-Jitter datasets,
4 Snader et al. [35] propose the use of the Gini Coefficient [11] as a summary statistic of
the inequality of relay selection. In contrast, node prevalence measures the popularity
of a particular node. By calculating the node prevalence of each relay, we can study
the worst-case anonymity of a particular path selection technique, which happens
when the adversary has under its control the relays with highest node prevalences
(i.e., those used most often in anonymous paths).
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and less than 10% of routes using the PL-ASes trace. The corresponding perfor-
mance of the paths is shown in Fig. 1 through 4.
In comparison, node-based relay selection yields substantially higher node
prevalences. Fig. 6 shows the maximum node prevalence for the default Tor path
selection strategy [6] and Snader and Borisov’s proposed refinement [35] using
the Tor-BW dataset. (Tor’s routing algorithm takes no performance parameter
and is shown as a straight line.) For both strategies, high bandwidth relays are
attractive to all initiators. In particular, the highest bandwidth node is present
in 36.9% of all paths produced using the default Tor algorithm. The tunable
Snader-Borisov strategy has a modest maximum node prevalence of 2.0% when
s = 3, but results in much poorer anonymity for greater values of s. When
s = 15, 79.2% of paths contain the node with the greatest bandwidth. Although
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 cannot be directly compared since they use different underlying
topologies and metrics, it is apparent from the figures that while there are no
statically-attractive relays as perceived by Weighted, node-based techniques
result in hotspots that are present in a large fraction of paths.
Attack Strategies. We next consider various strategies available to the at-
tacker. As described above, we utilize a conservative attacker model in which
the adversary can choose a priori which relays he will compromise (up to some
fraction f of the network). We further assume that the attacker has complete
network knowledge (i.e., pairwise distances) to which to base his decision.
BestLinks: Compromising Attractive Links. In the BestLinks strategy, the
attacker compromises the endpoints of the most attractive links. Mirroring the
behavior of the initiator, the attacker ranks smaller distances more favorably if
the metric is latency, jitter, loss, or AS traversals, and views larger distances as
more advantageous for bandwidth. Given an ordering of links, the two endpoints
of each link are assigned to the attacker until he controls f · N relays.
The effectiveness of the BestLinks strategy is depicted in Fig. 7. The x-axis
denotes the fraction of nodes controlled by the attacker (f), while the y-axis plots
the resultant percentage of paths that are compromised. As can be observed from
the Fig., Weighted successfully protects most anonymous paths even when the
attacker controls 50% of the network. When paths are weighted heavily in favor
of performance (s = 15) and 30% of the network is controlled by the attacker,
only 12.4% of the anonymous paths in the King dataset become compromised
(Fig. 7(a)). Similarly, for bandwidth (Fig. 7(b)), 16.4% of paths are compromised
when 30% of the network is malicious. Results for the PL-ASes and PL-Jitter
datasets are comparable, and are omitted for brevity.
For comparison, Fig. 8 shows the percentage of compromised paths for node-
based selection strategies when the attacker uses the BestNodes attacker strat-
egy on the Tor-BW dataset. Analogous to BestLinks, BestNodes ranks nodes
according to their advertised bandwidths, with the attacker controlling the f ·N
nodes with greatest bandwidth. BestNodes is particularly successful against the
default Tor algorithm. When the attacker controls the top 10% of relays, he is
able to compromise 54.7% of anonymous paths. The Snader-Borisov (“SB”) algo-
rithm fares better for low values of s. However, the strategy becomes vulnerable
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Fig. 7. The percentage of compromised paths as a function of the fraction of com-
promised nodes when the attacker uses the BestLinks strategy and the initiator uses
Weighted with the (a) King and (b) S3-BW datasets. Points represent the mean value
with error bars (for s = 15) indicating the 5th and 95th percentiles. Error bars are
omitted for s = 15 for readability. In all cases, the 5th-95th percentile ranges for s = 15
were less than that for s = 15.
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Fig. 8. The percentage of compromised
paths when the attacker uses BestNodes
and the initiator uses node-based strate-
gies with the Tor-BW dataset
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Fig. 9. The percentage of compromised
paths when the attacker uses the
Confirmation strategy and the initiator
uses Weighted with the King dataset
when performance is more highly valued. An adversary who operates the top
30% of high bandwidth nodes controls 73.1% of paths when s = 15.
MedianDist: Compromising Nodes with Shortest Median Distances. Alterna-
tively, the attacker may choose the f · N nodes that have the smallest median
distance between itself and all other nodes. Intuitively, MedianDist locates re-
lays that are likely to be chosen due to their proximity to other relays. Fig. 10
plots the effectiveness of such a strategy when used with the King dataset. When
weighted most heavily in favor of performance (s = 15), only 13.1% of paths are
compromised when the attacker controls 30% of the network. Results for the
remaining link-based topologies are consistent with King and are omitted for
brevity. Although MedianDist is more effective than BestLinks, link-based re-
lay selection significantly limits the ability to compromise paths, even against
our powerful attacker.
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Fig. 10. The percentage of compromised paths as a function of the fraction of com-
promised nodes when the attacker uses the MedianDist strategy and the initiator uses
Weighted with the King dataset
Confirmation: Determining whether Alice is Communicating with Bob. The
previous attacks attempt to compromise arbitrary paths in the anonymous net-
work. In contrast, an attacker may apply the Confirmation attack to test
whether a fixed pair of nodes (Alice and Bob) is anonymously communicating.
Here, the attacker compromises the nearest node (e.g., having smallest RTT)
to Alice that has not yet been compromised, and does the same with respect
to Bob, and continues compromising nodes in this manner until he has controls
f · N nodes. That is, the attacker compromises the nodes that are nearest to
Alice and Bob to maximize the probability that he controls the first and last
relays in their anonymous path (assuming such a path exists).
The results of using the Confirmation strategy against the King dataset are
shown in Fig. 9. The figure plots the results of experiments between all pairwise
initiators and responders. In each experiment, the attacker compromises the f ·N
nodes in the manner described above to target the particular initiator and re-
sponder pair. When routes are weighted heavily in favor of performance (s = 9),
an attacker who controls 30% of the network and who can target particular ini-
tiator and responder pairs, can discern 34.4% of anonymous paths. As discussed
in Appendix A, a slightly modified Weighted strategy better protects against
the Confirmation attack at the cost of a small degree of performance.
Relay-in-the-Middle: Deducing Communication Endpoints. If the adversary
controls the middle relay (R2) in a three-relay anonymous path, she trivially knows
the first (R1) and last (R3) relays as well. Since Weighted ranks candidate paths
based on e2e path estimates (i.e., the cost of Alice→R1→R2→R3→Bob), the at-
tacker can estimate the cost of α →R1→R2→R3→ β for all possible initiator
and responder pairs α, β ∈ N \ {R1, R2, R3}, α = β. By applying Eq. 1, she can
compute the probability that a given candidate initiator/responder pair selected
the subsequence R1→R2→R3 in its anonymous path. Although the size of the
anonymity network and the performance parameter s may reduce the practical-
ity and usefulness of this attack, we describe a countermeasure in Appendix A.
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Cluster: Joining the Network with a Cluster of Nodes. An attacker may at-
tempt to attract anonymous paths by joining the network with a large cluster
of nodes that share a local network, offering low latency and high bandwidth
connections between malicious peers. The efficacy of Cluster is described in
Appendix D.
6 Practical Link-Based Path Selection
In this section, we explore the practical considerations of scalably deploying
link-based anonymous path selection over the Internet.
6.1 Link Cost Estimation
Our analysis in Section 5 assumes that the initiator has knowledge of pairwise
distances between potential relays. In practice, maintaining pairwise distances
will require O(N2) in communication and network state, hence imposing a sig-
nificant overhead on the anonymity network.
One practical solution to the above challenge is via the use of network coordi-
nate systems that enable the pairwise distances between all participating nodes
to be estimated to high accuracy with low overhead. Network coordinate systems,
such as Vivaldi [5], PIC [4], NPS [23], and Big Bang Simulation [31] map each
relay to n-dimensional coordinates such that the Euclidean distance between
two relays’ coordinates corresponds to the actual network distance between the
pair. Although their individual implementations differ, coordinate systems use
distributed algorithms in which each participant periodically measures the dis-
tance between itself and a randomly selected peer. By comparing the empirical
measurement with the Euclidean distance between the two nodes’ coordinates,
the relay can adjust its coordinate either towards (in the case of over-estimation)
or away from (for under-estimation) the neighbor’s coordinate.
Network coordinate systems are well-suited for link-based relay selection, ef-
fectively linearizing the quantity of information that must be stored and commu-
nicated. By downloading the coordinates of N relays, an initiator can estimate
the pairwise distances between them. These systems are lightweight, requiring
little bandwidth overhead, and adapt quickly to changes in the network [5]. Ad-
ditionally, these systems have proved to operate efficiently at Internet scale. For
example, the Vuze BitTorrent client [36] currently operates a coordinate system
consisting of more than one million nodes [16]. Finally, as we describe below,
there exist well-established techniques for securing these systems to ensure the
accuracy of advertised coordinates, preventing misbehaving relays from falsifying
their coordinates to attract traffic.
Performance Impact of Coordinate Systems. To quantify the accuracy of coordi-
nate systems, a well established metric is the median error ratio of each node –
the median of the percentage differences between the estimated and actual
distances between itself and all other relays in the network. Note that these
errors are due to the presence of network triangle inequality violations (TIVs)
that cannot be accurately modeled using Euclidean geometry.
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Fig. 11. Left: CDF of median error ratios for the King dataset. Right: Path performance
for the King dataset using actual network distances (“Actual”) and coordinate-based
distance estimations (“Estimated”). Points denote median values with errorbars rep-
resenting the standard deviation.
Fig. 11(left) plots the CDF of the median error ratios of all relays after sta-
bilization for the King dataset. Coordinates were calculated using Vivaldi [5]
with a 5 dimensional coordinate system. The median of the relays’ median error
ratios (the median error in link estimation) is just 10.9% (6.1ms). The use of
coordinate systems for non-latency metrics is considered later in this section.
Using the King dataset, Fig. 11(right) shows the resulting impact these es-
timation errors have on the actual e2e performance of anonymous paths. The
figure compares the e2e performance obtained using actual distances (“Actual”)
against the performance that results from using coordinate-based estimations
(“Estimated”). The use of the coordinate system to estimate distances produces
paths with low-latency. For example, when s = 15, the median e2e path latency
is 131.2ms using actual network distances; the use of virtual coordinates incurs
a modest 8% increase in latency, resulting in paths with a median e2e latency
of 141.9ms (still far below the 277.1ms median obtained by Uniform).
In addition to performance, the use of coordinate systems has implications to
anonymity. We investigate the relationship between coordinate-based link esti-
mation and anonymity in Appendix C. To summarize the results, the use of co-
ordinate systems does not decrease anonymity relative to using actual distances.
For example, an attacker who controls 30% of the network is able to compromise
29.0% of anonymous paths when he uses the MedianDist attack and the initiator
uses actual distances with s = 15. Using coordinate-based distance estimations
and keeping all other parameters fixed, the attack compromises 28.5% of paths.
6.2 Other Practical Considerations
We briefly outline other practical considerations of link-based relay selection.
Securing coordinate systems. The distributed nature of coordinate systems make
them vulnerable to manipulation if not properly defended. Malicious relays may
advertise false coordinates or delay measurement probes, either to make them-
selves appear more favorable or to cause disorder in the system. Fortunately,
practical techniques exist that mitigate such attacks. For example, the Veracity
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system protects the accuracy of coordinate systems when up to 40% of the net-
work is malicious [34,32]. Given the large number of available coordinate protec-
tion schemes [4,30,13,41,34,32], we consider the challenge of securing coordinate
systems to be orthogonal and out-of-scope of this paper.
Pairwise bandwidth estimation. Coordinate systems have been known to esti-
mate with high accuracy (i.e. low error ratios) link metrics that tend to be addi-
tive in nature when used to compute metrics across multiple links. Examples of
metrics that work well include latency and AS traversal. However, these systems
have been shown to be inaccurate at estimating pairwise bandwidth between
any two nodes, due to the high incidence of TIVs in bandwidth measurements.
However, we note that there have been a number of recent promising propos-
als that enable one to estimate pairwise bandwidth accurately and scalably. For
example, there have been several attempts to identify links that cause severe
network TIVs [37,18,17], enabling initiators to avoid them when forming paths.
Separate work [26,27] has directly addressed the problem of bandwidth embed-
dings, introducing techniques for embedding bandwidth distances in tree struc-
tures. Their results show that pairwise PlanetLab bandwidths can be embedded
with a median error ratio of approximately 0.25 [26]. Finally, as a third alter-
native, rather than rely on coordinate embedding systems, initiators can anony-
mously query network measurement services such as IDMaps [9] or iPlane [19]
to estimate the bandwidth of network links.
Locating the Responder. To estimate e2e path performance, the initiator must
predict the distance between the exit relay and the responder. The initiator
cannot estimate the cost of this final hop if the responder does not participate in
the coordinate system. Instead, the initiator can locate the closest relay to the
responder using publicly available network information services. For example,
OASIS [10], ClosestNode [1], and iPlane [19] all provide interfaces for resolving
the closest server to any given IP address. The initiator can anonymously query
such services to locate the relay that is nearest to the responder. The closest
relay can then proxy requests between the exit relay and the responder.
Alternatively, initiators can disregard the link between the exit relay and the
responder when selecting anonymous paths. As discussed in Appendix A, such
an approach incurs only a modest decrease in performance.
7 Conclusion
This paper makes the case for link-based relay selection for flexibly tuning the
performance and anonymity properties of anonymous paths. In comparison to
node-based techniques in which performance may be quantified only in terms of
node properties (i.e., bandwidth), link-based selection enables the generation of
high performance paths across multiple metrics: latency, jitter, loss, and band-
width. Using realistic network traces, we validate that our link-based Weighted
strategy reduced by 71% the number of paths with end-to-end latencies greater
than 250ms (in comparison to selecting relays uniformly at random), and dou-
bled the median available bandwidths of anonymous paths.
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We also show that link-based relay selection is also significantly more resilient
to manipulation than traditional node-based techniques. For example, when ap-
plying the default Tor path selection algorithm to a subset of bandwidth data
obtained from the Tor network, an adversary who controls the top 30% of highest
bandwidth relays is able to compromise 93.5% of anonymous paths. In compar-
ison, using Weighted on a network trace in which bandwidth is measured as a
link characteristic, an attacker who controls the same percentage of anonymizing
relays compromises less than a third of anonymous paths.
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Appendix A: A Revised Weighted Algorithm
The Weighted algorithm introduced in Section 4 ranks candidate paths by
the expected e2e path cost. Unlike node-based relay selection strategies, the e2e
path cost includes the links from the initiator to the first relay and from the last
relay to the responder, potentially leaking information about the communication
participants.
To prevent the Relay-in-the-Middle attack (see Section 5.2), an alternative
strategy is to exclude the first (from the initiator) and last (to the responder)
links when ranking paths. That is, the initiator ranks paths by the cost of the
subsequence R1→R2→R3, where R1, R2, and R3 are the relays in a candidate
path.
The revised Weighted strategy has two advantages. First, it disassociates
the communication endpoints from path selection. An adversary who knows the
identities of R1, R2, and R3 cannot infer any information about the initiator
and responder. Second, it does not require the responder to participate in the
coordinate system (see Section 6.2) since the distance from the exit relay to the
responder does not influence router selection.
The obvious cost of using the revised Weighted strategy is that the first
and last hops may be expensive, incurring poor performance even though the
subsequence R1→R2→R3 may be efficient.
Our experimental evaluation indicates that the performance penalty due to
the revised Weighted strategy is minimal. Fig. 12 shows the performance of
the vanilla and revised Weighted strategies with s = 9. For comparison, the
performance achieved using Uniform is also plotted. Although the unmodified
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the Confirmation strategy and the initia-
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King dataset
Weighted algorithm achieves the lowest median e2e path latency (156.3ms),
the modified version also achieves significantly lower latencies (174.9ms) than
Uniform (277.2ms).
Fig. 13 compares the resilience to the Confirmation attack using the vanilla
and modified versions of Weighted. Since the positions of the initiator and
responder do not influence relay selection when revised Weighted is used, the
attacker’s strategy is less effective. For example, when 30% of nodes are ma-
licious, the attacker compromises 34.4% of paths when the initiator uses the
unmodified Weighted technique and only 18.5% against revised Weighted.
Appendix B: Preventing the Predecessor Attack
An anonymized connection between an initiator and responder is often reset due
to node churn, requiring it to be reconstructed using different relays [39]. The
adversary can conduct a predecessor attack to discover the initiator by counting
the number of times each relay precedes the attackers’ relays in the anonymous
path [28,39]. Since the initiator is always present in such circuits, it will have a
higher count than the relays that are chosen randomly whenever the circuit is
rebuilt.
Tor mitigates the predecessor attack by using a small number of fixed entry
nodes called guards [6]. Link-based path selection is equally vulnerable to the
predecessor attack, but may also be defended using guards. Guards must be
chosen carefully since their locations affect the performance of a path. However,
as described in Appendix A (see, in particular, Fig. 12), link-based routing pro-
duces high performance paths even if the first hop (connecting the initiator to
the guard node) is not considered by the path selection algorithm. Link-based
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routing may therefore adopt the same mitigation strategy as Tor [7]; namely,
the initiator selects a relay (having a long uptime) to act as its entry guard for
all anonymous paths.
Appendix C: The Impact of Coordinate Systems on
Anonymity
Coordinate systems linearize pairwise distances by mapping each node to
n-dimensional coordinates. Due to network triangle inequality violations that
cannot be represented in Euclidean space, coordinate systems do not perfectly
predict distances. As shown in Fig. 11(right), the use of coordinate systems im-
poses a modest decrease in path performance. In this Appendix, we consider the
effects of using coordinate systems on anonymity.
Fig. 14 shows the percentage of compromised paths using the King dataset
when the attacker applies the MedianDist strategy. The figure compares perfor-
mance results obtained using network distances (“Actual”) to estimations based
on the coordinate system (“Coord”). As can be observed from the Fig., the effec-
tiveness of the attack does not substantially differ when actual and coordinate
distances are used. For example, when s = 15 and actual distances are used,
an attacker who controls 30% of the network can compromise 29.0% of paths.
In comparison, the same attacker can compromise 28.5% of paths when virtual
coordinates are used in place of actual distances.
Appendix D: The Cluster Attack
An attacker may attempt to compromise a large fraction of anonymous paths by
joining the anonymity network using multiple nodes from the same LAN. Due to
Scalable Link-Based Relay Selection for Anonymous Routing 93
the high bandwidths and low latencies within the LAN, paths composed entirely
of malicious nodes from the LAN will have low e2e cost estimates and will be
favored by the Weighted algorithm.
Since our experimental datasets do not contain large clusters of similarly lo-
cated nodes, it was necessary to adapt the attacker model to permit the attacker
to insert nodes. To determine the location for the new nodes, we first use the
Vivaldi [5] virtual embedding system to assign n-dimensional coordinates to
each node in the existing topology such that the Cartesian distance between two
nodes’ coordinates corresponds to the network distance (e.g., latency) between
them. To provide the attacker with a desirable location in the topology, we as-
sign each malicious node a coordinate that is at most 5ms from the centroid of
the network. Hence, any two malicious nodes are separated by at most 10ms.
Locations from the centroid are randomly chosen according to Muller’s uniform
hypersphere point generation technique [20]. Network distances between a mali-
cious node and another peer are estimated using the Cartesian distance between
the nodes’ coordinates.
Fig. 15 illustrates the efficacy of the Cluster attack when the initiator uses
the Weighted algorithm with s = 9 on the King dataset. When the attacker
controls 28.6% of the network (i.e., he adds 200 nodes to the existing 500 node
topology), he compromises just 35.6% of anonymous paths.
It is worth noting that the Cluster attack may be further mitigated by re-
quiring that adjacent nodes in anonymous paths reside in separate autonomous
systems or have a minimum latency between them.
